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COMMENTS 
THE INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE 
Intracorporate conspb·acy arises when a corporation and its 
own officers, directors, employees, or agents conspire to violate 
the law. The doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy has posed 
conceptual problems for the courts, however, because under cor-
porate agency principles a corporation is personified through the 
acts of its agents and therefore the requisite element of plurality 
of actors is not present. Notwithstanding this conceptual diffi-
culty, courts have applied the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 
in some contexts. This comment reviews the history of the intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine and its varied application in the 
areas of antitrust, civil rights, and crimina/law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, a corporation is 
deemed capable of engaging in a conspiracy with its own officers, direc-
tors, employees, and agents.' Courts have had difficulty accepting the 
concept of intracorporate conspiracy, however, because under elemen-
tary principles of corporate agency law a corporation is personified 
through the acts of its agents. 2 The acts of corporate agents thus become 
the acts of the corporation and the corporation is viewed as the sole legal 
actor. 3 Because a conspiracy requires a plurality of actors, the personifi-
cation of the corporation as the sole legal actor defeats a conspiracy 
charge.4 
Courts have recognized the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in 
some contexts, but not in others. In some areas of the law, courts bar the 
doctrine on the conceptual grounds just stated. 5 In other areas of the 
law, courts have held that the purposes, policies, and practicalities sup-
porting recognition of the doctrine outweigh any conceptual problem and 
justify intracorporate conspiratorial liability.6 This Comment reviews 
1. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1170 (1983). See generally Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate 
Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 437-40 (1983). 
2. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970. 
3. Jd. 
4. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
S. See, e.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 
1985); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Corp., SOS F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1974). 
6. See, e.g., Hartley, 678 F.2d 961; United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 
1982); Dussuoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (Sth Cir. 1981); Novotny v. 
Great Am. Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n., 584 F.2d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1978), vacated on other 
grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). See also Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability- A 
Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. L. 129, 143-45 (1984) (noting that federal 
courts almost uniformly have held that a corporation and its officers and agents are 
generally incapable of conspiring under antitrust law while the same courts have 
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the history of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, examines justifica-
tions for acceptance and rejection of the doctrine, and addresses specific 
application of the doctrine in the areas of antitrust, civil rights, and crim-
inal law. 
II. THE INTRA CORPORATE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE 
GENERALLY 
A. Origins and Development of Conspiracy Law 
At common law, conduct constituting-conspiracy was viewed very 
narrowly. The earliest common law conspiracy was limited to situations 
involving abuse of legal process; that is, only a confederacy or alliance for 
the false and malicious promotion of various pleas and indictments was 
recognized as conspiracy. 7 This earliest form of conspiracy soon was 
supplemented by various statutes directed against combinations for trea-
sonous purposes, breaches of the peace, disturbance of the markets by 
merchants, price raising by merchants, and the raising of hourly wages 
by laborers. 8 
The modem concept of conspiracy has grown out of the early doc-
trine that the crux of the crime is the intent. 9 The basic theory was that 
an evil intent manifested by any act done in furtherance of such intent 
might be punishable, although the act did not amount in law to attempt. 
Under this reasoning, the infamous Star Chamber, in 1611, finally settled 
a recurring question under developing conspiracy law. In Poulterers' 
Case, 10 the Star Chamber held that the agreement for the combination or 
confederacy was indictable as a substantive offense. 11 In effect, the agree-
ment of two parties became the "act" done in furtherance of the conspir-
acy in the eyes of the law. From this holding, conspiracy law theory 
made an easy transition to the view that the agreement or combination 
itself should be regarded as a complete act of conspiracy. 12 The result is 
a modem definition of conspiracy generally defined as: (1) an agreement, 
(2) by two or more persons, (3) to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful 
act by unlawful means. 13 Still, general agreement on a definition of con-
universally recognized that a corporation may be liable under general conspiracy 
law for purely intracorporate agreements); Welling, lntracorporate Plurality in 
Criminal Law Conspiracy, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 1155, 1156-58 (1982) (The question of 
whether multiple agents of a single corporation can constitute a plurality has been 
answered differently by the courts in different contexts - in antitrust and civil 
rights cases, courts generally have held that multiple agents are not a plurality but 
that the requisite pluality exists in the criminal law context). 
7. R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES AND AGREEMENTS 6 (re-
printed ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. 
REV. 393, 396 (1922) [hereinafter Sayre). 
8. Jd. 
9. WRIGHT, supra note 7 at 6; SAYRE, supra note 7 at 398. 
10. 9 Coke 55b, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611). 
11. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
12. Jd. at 7. 
13. Mason v. State, 302 Md. 434, 444, 488 A.2d 955, 960 (1985) (defining criminal 
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spiracy does not solve all issues arising under conspiracy law. One prom-
inent issue of controversy is whether a corporation is capable of 
conspiracy. 
B. lntracorporate Conspiracy and the Dilemma it Presents 
In modem conspiracy law, the corporation is generally viewed as an 
entity or person capable of conspiring. 14 This general rule of corporate 
conspiratorial liability is questioned, however, when an intracorporate 
conspiracy is alleged. 
Under basic agency principles, authorized acts of corporate officers, 
directors, employees, and agents are attributed to the corporate persona 
ficta. 15 The corporation becomes a legal actor with the appurtenant 
rights and responsibilities. Under the intracorporate conspiracy doc-
trine, however, a corporation is deemed to have conspired with its own 
agents. 16 Thus, principles of agency law conflict with principles of con-
spiracy law. On one hand, the agent's conduct is attributed to the corpo-
conspiracy); Beye v. Bureau of National Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 658, 477 A.2d 
1197, 1206 (1984) (defining civil conspiracy). See also W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 525 (2d ed) [hereinafter LAFAVE]. 
14. The concept of the corporation as a "person" or entity can be traced as far back as 
the thirteenth century. Ancient canon law is credited with the creation of the cor-
porate persona ficta concept. See Rooney, Maitland and the Corporate Revolution, 
26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 24, 32 (1951). Early common law also recognized the corpora-
tion as an entity, viewing the corporate existence as a concession from the state that 
justified increased governmental control and taxation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, 
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS§ 9, at 18 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter HENN]. American 
corporate law, derived from common law, similarly began by treating the corpora-
tion as an entity established by special concession from the state. /d. § 12, at 24. 
Subsequent developments, such as general incorporation statutes and competition 
among the states for corporate business, have resulted in increased powers and 
rights for the corporate entity. Today, the corporation is usually regarded as a per-
son unless the subject matter or context of a particular constitutional, statutory, or 
common law provision requires otherwise. /d. § 80, at 179. For a discussion of the 
corporations rights see H. 0LECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW Vol. 1 § 7, at 23 
(1958). See generally Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People 
Justly, 13 GA. L. REV. 1245 (1979). 
The usual situation where the corporation conspires with parties or entities 
outside the corporate structure can be termed an extracorporate conspiracy. See 
Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 431, 440 (1983). In such a case the plurality requirement is satisfied and con-
spirational liability imposed upon the corporation. See United States v. Hartley, 
678 F.2d 961, 968-69 (11th Cir. 1982) (dictum), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). 
In Hartley, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a finding sufficient to connect outside 
actors with corporate actions justified convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371, and that 
existence of the non corporate conspirators alleviates the need for examination of the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. /d. at 968-70. 
15. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970; Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914. Cf 2 W. FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 437 (Rev. ed. 1982). 
16. Dussuoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The 
concept of intracorporate conspiracy raises difficult conceptual problems . . . on 
whether such a conspiracy is possible."); see also Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger 
and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 437-40 (1983). 
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ration; on the other hand, the agent and the corporation are considered 
distinct entities capable of conspiracy. Under the intracorporate conspir-
acy doctrine, principles of agency law are subordinated to the principles 
of conspiracy law in order to impose conspiratorial liability on the corpo-
ration or its agents. 
Critics of intracorporate conspiracy doctrine adopt the single legal 
actor approach. 17 Illustrative of this approach is the Fifth Circuit opin-
ion in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola. 18 In Nelson Radio & Sup-
ply, the United States Department of Justice alleged that a corporation, 
its president, sales manager, officers, employees, representatives, and 
agents had conspired to violate provisions of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. 19 The Fifth Circuit observed that because the only mediums 
through which a corporation can act are its officers, representatives, and 
agents, the authorized acts of the agents are acts attributable to the cor-
poration under law.20 The court thus viewed the corporation as the sole 
legal actor. After noting that conspiracy law requires two or more par-
ties be engaged in an agreement, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of 
the conspiracy count for lack of a plurality of actors.21 By viewing the 
corporation as the sole legal actor, the Fifth Circuit avoided the inconsis-
tent application of attribution principles that occurs under the intracor-
porate conspiracy doctrine. 
Not all courts accept the rationale of Nelson Radio & Supply, how-
ever, and debate over the appropriateness of intracorporate conspiracy 
continues unabated. 22 Proponents of the doctrine view it as a necessary 
means of curbing corporate conspiracy. Whether the doctrine is ac-
cepted or rejected often turns on the particular context of the law in 
which the doctrine arises.23 In some instances the social policies, legisla-
tive purposes, and practical realities mandate acceptance of the doctrine, 
while in others they do not. The arguments or justifications for accept-
ance or rejection of the doctrine, balanced against each other, determine 
whether imposition of intracorporate conspiratorial liability is appropri-
ate in a given case. 
17. For a discussion of the single legal actor theory see Note, lntracorporate (:onspira-
cies under 42 U.S. C. § 1985(c), 92 HARV. L. REv. 470, 477-85 (1978). 
18. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
19. /d. at 914. 
20. /d. 
21. In Nelson Radio & Supply, the Fifth Circuit specifically stated that, "A corporation 
cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individual can .... " Nelson, 200 
F.2d at 914. 
22. Compare Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & L. Ass'n., 584 F.2d 1235, 1258 (3d Cir. 
1978) (adopting the doctrine), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); with 
Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210, 214 (D.D.C. 1985) (rejecting the doctrine). 
23. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. L. 
129, 144-45 (1984); Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Law Conspiracy, 
33 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1156 (1982). 
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C. Justifications for Acceptance or Rejection of Intracorporate 
Conspiracy · 
Proponents of intracorporate conspiracy defend the doctrine by rec-
ognizing that personification of the corporation is a legal fiction that ex-
pands corporate liability.24 By attributing an agent's conduct to the 
corporation, legal responsibility is extended to the corporation. Advo-
cates argue that attribution of conduct rules are applicable only where 
liability can be extended and should not be used to immunize the corpo-
ration and its agents from conspiratorialliability.25 Additionally, propo-
nents suggest that non-recognition of intracorporate conspiracy is 
contrary to the underlying rationale of conspiracy law,26 which is to pro-
hibit wrongful group action. Proponents argue that failure to recognize 
the intracorporate conspiracy allows wrongful group action in the corpo-
rate setting to flourish unchecked. 27 
Proponents of the intracorporate conspiracy theory also maintain 
that acceptance of the doctrine is likely to produce more efficient internal 
policing by corporations. Advocates challenge the belief that rejecting 
the single legal actor approach will have a detrimental effect on the busi-
ness environment. 28 They contend that a corporation is able to factor 
into its operational decisions all of the opportunity costs that arise, in-
cluding the possibility of conspirationalliability.29 Proponents contend 
that, as a matter of public policy, the imposition of conspiratorial liability 
should be borne by the corporation as a cost associated with its enter-
24. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982) (dictum), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1170 (1983) ("[T]he underlying purpose is ... to expand corporate respon-
sibility."); Dussuoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[A 
purpose] of the rule attributing agents' conduct to a corporation [is] ... to require a 
corporation to bear the costs of its business enterprise."). 
25. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & L. Assn., 584 F.2d 1235, 1257 (3d Cir. 1978), 
vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). Addressing the issue ofintracorpo-
rate conspiratorial liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Third Circuit stated, "we 
can perceive no function to be served by immunizing such action once a business is 
incorporated." /d. 
26. Brickey, supra note 6, at 439. 
27. The foundation of conspiratorial liability is "group danger." Conspiracy is punish-
able because of the belief that the joint nature of the undertaking increases the risk 
of successful achievement of the unlawful objective of the agreement. /d. Not rec-
ognizing the inherent group danger of the concerted actions of corporate employees 
is the consequence of the rejection of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. 
28. Cf Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking- Nineteenth Annual 
Review, 76 YALE L. J. 92, 121 (1966). "If the plurality of actors demanded by Sec-
tion l were satisfied by the officers and directors of a single company, then no corpo-
rate action would be immune from antitrust attack. Even an individual 
proprietorship could not transact any business without violating the antitrust laws." 
/d. 
29. The corporation can not only obtain liability insurance for itself, but the corporate 
officers and directors can be insured by the corporation. See 13 W. FLETCHER, 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 6045.4, at 651-52 (Rev. 
ed. 1984). 
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prise.3° Finally, proponents argue that, in some cases, principles of statu-
tory construction may be applied to support the imposition of 
intracorporate liability. 31 
Opponents of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine rely heavily on 
the single legal actor approach. The view that the corporation is the sole 
legal actor is supported by a number of arguments. First, the single legal 
actor approach provides consistent application of attribution of conduct 
rules under agency law.32 Second, intracorporate conspiratorial liability 
arguably can have a detrimental effect upon business operations by "chil-
ling" the creativity and aggressiveness of corporate directors and of-
ficers. 33 Third, advocates of the single legal actor approach argue that 
liability should not be imposed on the corporation because the corpora-
tion is only a tool, neutral in its instrumental nature.34 Finally, depend-
ing on the particular context, critics of intracorporate conspiracy utilize 
principles of statutory interpretation and construction to support their 
position. 35 
Even courts that reject the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine on 
the basis of the sole legal actor theory frequently recognize the "indepen-
dently motivated actor" rule to impose conspiratorial liability on corpo-
rate personnel. This rule arose from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Nelson 
Radio & Supp/y. 36 In that case, the court, in rejecting the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine, observed that "it [was not] alleged affirmatively, ex-
pressly, or otherwise, that these officers, agents, and employees were ac-
tuated by any motives personal to themselves."37 Courts have 
interpreted this language as creating the independently or personally mo-
30. Cf lOW. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 4877, at 322-27 (Rev. ed. 1984); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 219(1), 
Comment a (1958). 
31. In antitrust law, controversy over the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine implicates 
both Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act. In order to give full effect to the 
entire statutory scheme, rules of statutory interpretation and construction must be 
considered. See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. In each of the other two 
contexts that this comment addresses, civil rights law and criminal law, only one 
statutory provision is implicated. Consequently, rules of statutory interpretation 
and construction are not as applicable. 
32. The general rule is that the acts of the agents are acts of the corporation. Girard v. 
94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 
(1976); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
33. See supra note 28. 
34. Cf Caroline, Corporate Criminality and the Courts, 27 CRIM. L.Q. 237, 253 (1985). 
35. The Third Circuit in Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 
(3d Cir. 1978), vacated, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), undertook an indepth analysis in deter-
mining that intracorporate conspiracy exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The court 
examined the history of the section, the broad wording of the statute, possible con-
flicts with other statutes, as well as the policies underlying the statute. 
36. Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. 
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
37. Nelson Radio & Supply, 200 F.2d at 914. 
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tivated actor exception to non-liability.38 
In Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 39 for example, 
the trial court granted summary judgment fpr the corporate defendant on 
a charge of conspiracy under Section One of the Sherman Act. 40 The 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the general rule that a corporation cannot be 
guilty of an intracorporate antitrust conspiracy because of the single legal 
actor rule.41 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit reversed the summary 
judgment granted on the complaint,42 reasoning that an exception to the 
general rule is justified when a corporate officer has an independent per-
sonal stake in achieving the corporation's illegal objective.43 
The personally motivated employee is viewed no differently than 
someone outside of the corporation because the employee is acting with-
out concern as to whether his actions benefit the corporation. Hence, a 
conspiracy between personally motivated agents and the corporation is 
not, in reality, an intracorporate conspiracy.44 Rather, the conspiracy is 
between the corporation and outside parties - the personally motivated 
actors. Classifying corporate agents as personally motivated, therefore, 
takes the case out of an intracorporate or single legal actor analysis. 
III. VIABILITY OF INTRA CORPORATE CONSPIRACY IN 
SPECIFIC CONTEXTS 
Courts balance the arguments presented above in favor of and 
against the intracorporate conspiracy theory. Which considerations 
carry greater weight varies depending upon the particular context. The 
following discussion addresses the viability of the doctrine in the various 
contexts in which the doctrine most frequently arises. 
A. Antitrust Law 
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first gained popular recogni-
tion in the field of antitrust law.45 Antitrust law is also the context in 
38. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 956 (lith Cir. 
1986); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1496 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 
1974); Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1969). 
39. 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974). 
40. Greenville Publishing, 496 F.2d 391, 393 (4th Cir. 1974). In Greenville Publishing, 
the corporate defendant was charged with conspiracy under both Section One and 
Section Two of the Shennan Act. The Fourth Circuit only remanded the Section 
Two claim for further consideration. 
41. Jd. at 399. 
42. Jd. at 400. 
43. Jd. at 399. 
44. If conduct of an agent is not within the scope of his authority, then the conduct is 
not attributed to the corporation. See 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4877, at 325 (Rev. ed. 1984). Because that em-
ployee's conduct is not attributable to the corporation, he constitutes the second 
legal actor necessary for the conspiracy plurality. 
45. The intracorporate conspiracy debate is generally traced back to the decision of the 
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which rejection of the doctrine occurs most frequently. 46 The focus of 
the intracorporate conspiracy debate under antitrust law centers on Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits conspiracies in 
restraint of trade or commerce.47 Although the United States Supreme 
Court has addressed intra-enterprise conspiracy under Section One,48 it 
has never spoken specifically on the validity of intracorporate conspirato-
rial liability under that section. 49 The lower federal courts and state 
courts considering the issue consistently have held that the doctrine does 
not apply. 50 
The first court to consider the intracorporate conspiracy theory 
under Section One of the Sherman Act was the Fifth Circuit in Nelson 
Radio & Supp/y. 51 As noted earlier, the court rejected conspiratoriallia-
Fifth Circuit in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th 
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953), which examined the concept under 
antitrust law. See United States v. Hartley, 768 F.2d 961, 970 (lith Cir. 1982) 
("The premier case applying general agency principles to preclude intracorporate 
conspiracy was ... in the antitrust context."). 
46. The overwhelming majority of courts posed with the issue of intracorporate conspir-
acy under Section One of the Sherman Act reject the doctrine. See infra note 50. 
47. Section One of the Sherman Act states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any 
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be 
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall 
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, 
if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of 
the court. 
15 U.S.C. § l (Supp. 1987). 
48. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine governs conspiratorial liability within 
multi-enterprise corporations where the relationships between alleged conspirators 
are those of parent-subsidiary, or corporate entitles controlled by the same individu-
als. See Brickey, supra note 6, at 144 n.66. Some commentators read the intra-
enterprise doctrine broadly to include conspiracies involving both corporate subsidi-
aries and corporate agents, directors, officers and employees. L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST§ llA, at 323-29 (1977); Handler & Smart, The 
Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 23, 
26-38 (1981). The Supreme Court specifically addressed the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy theory under Section One of the Sherman Act in Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The Court held that a corporation and 
its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each other for pur-
poses of Section One of the Sherman Act. 
49. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), the 
Supreme Court, in dictum, did note that, "nothing in the language of the Sherman 
Act is inconsistent with the view that corporations cannot conspire with their own 
officers." /d. at 770, n.l5. 
50. See, e.g., Quality Foods de Centro Am. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Devl. Corp., 711 
F.2d 989, 997, n.9 (lith Cir. 1983); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc., v. Morton Bldgs., 
Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 
504, 508 (4th Cir. 1974); Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and 
Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 82 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). 
51. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). Nelson Radio & 
Supply repeatedly has been recognized as the first case applying the intracorporate 
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bility on the basis of the single legal actor theory. 52 The court noted that 
the actions of the corporate agents consisted of carrying out their day to 
day responsibilities and implementing the corporation's management 
policy.53 The court also recognized that, under agency law, the corpo-
rate entity can only act through its officers and representatives and there-
fore the acts of the agents are really the acts of the corporation. 54 
Perhaps the most important consideration that the court relied 
upon, however, was the statutory scheme under the Sherman Act. 55 The 
Sherman Act establishes a comprehensive legislative scheme that regu-
lates a wide range of conduct, including conspiracy, monopoly, and re-
straint of trade. The court observed that intracorporate acts were not 
actionable under Section One but could be actionable under Section 
Two. 56 Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies, attempts 
to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize by the 
agents of a single corporation. 57 Because the anti-competitive conduct of 
the one entity is covered under Section Two, courts hold that interpret-
ing Section One as covering intracorporate conspiracy situations would 
render language of Section Two meaningless. 58 Because one of the cardi-
nal rules of statutory interpretation is a statute should be construed so as 
conspiracy doctrine under Section One of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States 
v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The premier case ... was Nelson 
Radio & Supply . ... "); Dussnoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (referring to the intracorporate debate and the "Nelson Radio" rule); 
Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, supra note 
6, at 145; Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Law Conspiracy, supra note 
6, at 1162. 
52. Nelson Radio & Supply, 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 
(1953). 
53. /d. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. 
56. Section Two of the Sherman Act states: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if 
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1987). 
57. As the Nelson court stated: "(T]he acts of the corporate officers may bring a single 
corporation within section 2 of the Sherman Act .... " 200 F.2d at 914. See also 
White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942); 
Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915). 
58. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 971 (11th Cir. 1982) (dictum), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1170 (1983) ("If section one's conspiracy charge was satisfied by a single 
corporate entity, it would render section two meaningless."); Dussuoy v. Gulf Coast 
Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594,603 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[A]pplying the prohibition of combi-
nations in restraint of trade contained in section 1 of the Sherman Act to the activi-
ties by a single firm renders meaningless section 2 .... ") 
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to avoid rendering language meaningless or surplusage, 59 courts gener-
ally reject the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under Section One of 
the Sherman Act. 60 
B. Civil Rights Law Under Section 1985(3) 
A second area of the law where debate over the intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine continues is civil rights law. The question of intracorpo-
rate conspiracy arises under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), which prohibits 
conspiracies depriving individuals of the equal protection of the law or 
equal privileges and immunities under the law.61 In this area of the law, 
acceptance of the doctrine varies among jurisdictions. 62 The Supreme 
59. In construing a statute a court is obliged, if reasonably possible, to read the statute 
so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, 
meaningless or nugatory. Rome v. Lowenthal, 290 Md. 33, 41, 428 A.2d 75, 79 
(1981). 
60. See supra note 50. Most states also have statutory provisions regulating antitrust 
activity, generally similar in form to the Sherman Act. See, e.g., MD. CoM. LAW 
CODE ANN. § 11-202 (1983 & Supp.1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 340 (1968 & 
Supp. 1986). A corporate defendant must be aware that state law could be inter-
preted differently than federal antitrust law. In Dussuoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 
660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981), for example, the Fifth Circuit noted that state anti-
trust law could be read more broadly than its federal counterpart. However state 
anitrust law generally will be interpreted as consistent with federal case law. See, 
e.g., Quality Discount Tires, Inc. v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 282 Md. 7, 
11, 382 A.2d 867, 869 (1978) ("The purpose of the [Maryland Antitrust] Act is to 
'complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade' ... and ... 'in 
construing this subtitle, the courts [should] be guided by the interpretation given by 
the federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or .similar 
matters.'") (quoting Commercial Law Article,§ 11-202); State v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
38 N.Y.2d 460, 463, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428, 344 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1976). 
61. Section 1985(3) states: 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise 
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal 
protection of the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the 
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing all 
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or 
if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or 
threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support 
or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any 
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or 
as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in 
person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of 
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein 
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such con-
spiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived 
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recov-
ery of damages occassioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one 
or more of the conspirators. 
42 u.s.c. § 1985(3) (1981). 
62. Compare Novotony v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 584 F.2d 1235, 1259 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (concerted action among corporate officers and directors cannot consti-
tute a conspiracy under section 1985(3)) with Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Corp., 
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Court had an opportunity to examine the validity of intracorporate con-
spiracy theory under section 1985(3) in Great American Federal Savings 
& Loan Association v. Novotny.63 Unfortunately, the Court vacated the 
judgment on other grounds without commenting on intracorporate con-
spiracy.64 Therefore, the current division in federal case law remains. 
The first line of cases deciding whether intracorporate conspiracies 
are actionable under section 1985(3) is derived from the Seventh Circuit's 
opinion in Dombrowski v. Dowling,65 authored by Associate Supreme 
Court Justice Blackmun. In Dombrowski, the plaintiff alleged that are-
alty corporation and its employee denied him rental space because many 
of his clients were members of minority groups.66 The Seventh Circuit 
noted that only one corporation was involved and that the individual 
defendant acted within the scope of his authority.67 The Dombrowski 
court then held that the statutory requirement of section 1985(3) that 
two or more persons conspire is not satisfied by proof that a discrimina-
tory business decision reflects the collective judgment of two or more 
executives of the same corporation. 68 
Courts have construed Dombrowski to mean that a single business 
decision or act by one business entity is not actionable under section 
1985(3). However, courts adopting the Dombrowski formulation must 
decide whether the nonrecognition of the intracorporate conspiracy ap-
plies to cases where continued and varied instances of discrimination and 
harassment are alleged. Courts disagree on this issue. 69 A number of 
courts, employing the Dombrowski rule of nonrecognition of intracorpo-
rate conspiratorial liability, find liability in the multiple instances situa-
tion. These courts find that the Dombrowski rule is appropriate for one 
single act, but that the rule loses practicality where two or more corpo-
rate agents commit different discriminatory acts. 70 Other courts rely 
upon Dombrowski to reject the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, even 
where more than a single discriminatory act is alleged under section 
505 F.2d 181, 182-83 (8th Cir. 1974) (single acts of discrimination not actionable 
under § 1985(3)); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(same) and Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210, 214 (D. D.C. 1985) (single or multi-
ple acts of discrimination not actionable under § 1985(3) since there can be no con-
spiracy by purely intracorporate actions). 
63. 442 u.s. 366 (1979). 
64. /d. The Supreme Court stated that, "For the purposes of [this case], we assume but 
certainly do not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a conspir-
acy within the meaning of§ 1985(3)." /d. at 372, n.11. 
65. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). 
66. /d. at 191. 
67. /d. at 196. 
68. /d. 
69. Compare Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa 1974) (ongoing 
policy of harassment and discrimination actionable under§ 1985(3)); with Weaver 
v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C 1985) (corporation not liable for conspiracy 
under§ 1985(3) even for multiple acts). 
70. See, e.g., Craft v. Board of Trustees, 516 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1981); An-Ti 
Chai v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137, 1167 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
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1985(3).71 Thus, the Dombrowski analysis has been both embraced and 
rejected when applied beyond the facts of that case. 
A second line of cases dealing with the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine under section 1985(3) holds that considerations of policy require 
application of the doctrine. 72 This reasoning is exemplified by the Third 
Circuit's opinion in Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan 
Association.73 In Novotny, the plaintiff alleged that members of the cor-
poration's board of directors intentionally and deliberately embarked 
upon a course of conduct which denied equal employment opportunities 
for certain employees. 74 The Third Circuit reviewed the history of sec-
tion 1985(3)75 and noted that the Supreme Court had expressed concern 
that the section would give rise to a general federal tort law. 76 The 
Novotny opinion indicates, however, that the Third Circuit does not be-
lieve that interpretation of section 1985(3) to include intracorporate con-
spiracies encourages development of general federal tort law. 
The Novotny court acknowledged the Dombrowski single act rule, 
but found unpersuasive the line of cases adopting that rule. 77 The court 
chose to view the corporate defendant's reliance on the single legal actor 
rule as an allegation that incorporation confers an immunity from section 
1985(3) liability for corporate employees.78 The court chose not to im-
munize corporate conduct regardless of whether single or multiple acts 
are alleged. 
Since the Novotny decision, courts addressing intracorporate con-
spiracy under section 1985(3) continue to disagree whether acceptance of 
the doctrine is justified. 79 Although there is some authority for a per se 
rejection of conspiratorial liability for the discriminatory acts alleged, 
most courts considering the doctrine agree that multiple acts are actiona-
ble under section 1985(3). 80 Thus, the current controversy centers on 
whether the allegation of a single discriminatory act is actionable. The 
approach to this issue espoused in Novotny appears to be the best ap-
proach because conspiracy law principles only require an agreement to 
do one illegal act and not an agreement to do a number of illegal acts. 
71. See Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210, 214 (D.D.C. 1985). 
72. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 
1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Jacobs v. Board of Regents, 
473 F. Supp. 663, 670 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
73. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). 
74. Id. at 1237. 
75. Id. at 1238-40. 
76. Id. at 1240. 
77. Id. at 1259. 
78. Id. at 1257. 
79. Compare Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1252 (4th Cir. 1985) with An-Ti Chai v. 
Michigan Tech. Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137, 1166 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
80. In Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1985), the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia considered intracorporate conspiracy under sec-
tion 1985(3). The court found that a per se rejection of the doctrine was justified 
under the section. /d. at 214. 
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C Criminal Law 
A number of courts recently have addressed the intracorporate con-
spiracy doctrine in the criminal law context. Four United States Courts 
of Appeals have considered the problem in prosecutions brought under 
the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. section 371.81 These 
courts have all held that intracorporate conspiratorial liability is justified 
in the criminal context. 82 Illustrative of the approach taken is the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hartley. 83 
In Hartley, the defendant corporation was charged. ~ith conspiracy 
under 18 U.S.C. section 371,84 The court noted the inherent conflict that 
exists between agency principles and intracorporate conspiracy theory.85 
However, the court dismissed any conceptual difficulty without an ex-
haustive analysis. Rather, the Hartley court simply stated that intracor-
porate conspiratorial liability is justified under criminal law because 
corporations are personified to extend corporate responsibility. 86 The 
court reasoned that employing the fiction of the corporate personality in 
the criminal context would not expand corporate liability, but rather 
would narrow such liability inappropriately.87 
The recognition of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine seems to 
be most certain in the criminal law area. In addition to the uniformity 
among court decisions, most commentators agree that criminal responsi-
bility for intracorporate conspiratorial acts is proper.88 Further, case law 
in other contexts in which the doctrine arises commonly refer to criminal 
law as the context in which expansive corporate responsibility is de-
manded. As stated by Associate Supreme Court Justice Harlan in 
81. Section 371, the general federal criminal conspiracy law, provides: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the 
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in 
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any 
act to effect the object of the conspiracy each shall be [found guilty). ... 
18 u.s.c. § 371 (1966). 
82. United States v. American Grain & Related Indus., 763 F.2d 312, 320 (8th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. 
S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 920 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 395 (1983); 
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970-72 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 1170 (1983). 
83. 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). 
84. The conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371 was only one of multiple charges 
brought against the defendants in Hartley. They were also charged with 17 counts 
of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 13A, 14 counts of interstate transportation of fraud-
ulently obtained money under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and one count under RICO, 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c). Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 965 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 1170 (1983). 
85. /d. at 970. 
86. /d. 
87. /d. 
88. See Welling, Intracorporate Pluraltiy in Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1155, 1201 (1983) (on balance, therefore, defining multiple agents to be a plu-
rality in the criminal context is the better rule). 
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United States v. Wise, 89 "[T]he fiction of corporate entity, operative to 
protect officers from contract liability [has] never been applied as a shield 
against criminal prosecutions. "90 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine presents conceptual diffi-
culty for courts seeking to establish a conspiracy between a corporation 
and its own directors, officers, and agents. The conceptual difficulty 
stems from agency principles. Normally, acts of a director, officer, or 
employee are attributed to the corporation and the corporation is viewed 
as the sole legal actor. With only one actor in law, a charge of conspir-
acy cannot be sustained. 
Courts choose to view the corporation as the sole legal actor in cer-
tain contexts, most notably antitrust law. These same courts, however, 
have not hesitated to ignore the fiction of the corporate person where 
expansion of liability is necessary most notably in civil rights and crimi-
nallaw. The approach has been to weigh factors both for and against the 
doctrine in reaching a societal judgment demanding corporate responsi-
bility in some contexts, but not in others. Consequently, a corporation 
and its own directors, officers, employees, and agents will be held liable 
only when the myriad of considerations dictate imposition of intracorpo-
rate conspiratorial liability. 
John T. Prisbe 
89. 370 u.s. 405 (1962). 
90. /d. at 417 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
